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The Supreme Court's Bifurcated
Interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause
By DANIEL SHAVIRO*
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... ,I Under a functional
view, the clause prevents prosecutorial misconduct and increases the reli-
ability of guilty verdicts by requiring that certain evidence be subject to
in-court challenge before it can serve as the basis for a conviction. Under
a formalistic view, the clause merely creates specific rules of the game for
criminal trials-rules that are constitutionally mandated without regard
to any policy.
Many people prefer a functional view; others, a formalistic view.
The Supreme Court prefers both. When the issue has been whether a
defendant's confrontation of a witness at trial was constitutionally ade-
quate, the Court has been formalistic and largely has disregarded policy.
But when the issue has been whether confrontation at trial was constitu-
tionally necessary (for instance, whether a conviction based on hearsay
was constitutional), the Court has treated the policy of ensuring reliabil-
ity as determinative.
Thus, the Court has applied a bifurcated approach to the Confronta-
tion Clause, without acknowledgement or explanation. This Article first
describes this approach through the examination of several recent cases.
Then it briefly considers both the defects of this approach and why the
Court has followed it.
Part I sets out the legal background of the Confrontation Clause.
Part II discusses the recent cases that have taken a bifurcated view of the
clause. Part III considers both the failings of the approach and the rea-
sons for it.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago; A.B., Princeton University, 1978;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1981. I am grateful to Albert Alschuler, Larry Kramer, and Geoffrey
Stone for valuable comments on an earlier draft, and to the Kirkland & Ellis Faculty Research
Fund and the Robert B. Roesing Faculty Fund for financial support.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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I. Legal Background
In Justice Harlan's words, the Confrontation Clause "comes to us
on faded parchment." 2 Like the hearsay rules, it reflects common-law
abhorrence of the Tudor and Stuart practice of trial by affidavit (as in the
notorious treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603, when a sworn affi-
davit by Lord Cobham, presumably obtained under duress, led to Ra-
leigh's execution even though Cobham had recanted and was available to
testify in person).'
Nevertheless, there is no direct evidence of the intent underlying the
enactment of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court considered
confrontation only rarely4 until 1965, when it held for the first time that
the clause applies against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Despite the lack of historical background, everyone seems to agree about
two things: that the clause does not say what it means and that it does
not mean what it says.
With respect to saying what it means, the statement that criminal
defendants have the right to "be confronted with" the witnesses against
them is far from self-explanatory. Nonetheless, since at least the time of
Dean Wigmore, it has generally been agreed that the words create a right
to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.6
With respect to meaning what it says, the Confrontation Clause on
its face is unambiguous: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.. .. "I
This clearly suggests that hearsay evidence can never be used to support a
criminal conviction. Yet this interpretation has long been rejected' even
by those who view defendants' constitutional rights most expansively.
2. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 244 (3d ed. 1984); E. GREEN & C. NESSON,
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 273 (1983).
4. But see Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (Confrontation Clause was not
violated, upon retrial of a defendant, by the use of the transcript of testimony at the first trial
of a subsequently deceased witness); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (Confrontation
Clause was violated by the use of evidence that other persons had been convicted of theft to
prove that property received by the defendant had been stolen).
5. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
6. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1365, 1395-1400 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
8. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243, in which the Court states:
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of
any of these safeguards [i.e., in-court confrontation] even by the death of the witness;
and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be read, he is deprived of the
advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has
designed for his protection. But general rules of this kind, however beneficent in
their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considera-
tions of public policy and the necessities of the case.
Nor could such an interpretation have been historically intended given
the longstanding hearsay exception under which dying declarations were
admissible as prosecution evidence of the cause of death in homicide
cases. 9 Thus, what the clause actually means is that defendants should
be allowed to confront adverse witnesses as a general rule but subject to
exceptions.
The issues presented by the Confrontation Clause divide into at least
two categories. In one, the prosecution uses hearsay evidence without
producing the out-of-court declarant, and the question is whether this
use falls within an unstated exception to the right of confrontation. In
the other, the defendant arguably confronted a prosecution witness at
some stage in the proceedings, but it is alleged that the encounter failed
to satisfy the clause."1
As the following Part shows, the Supreme Court seems tacitly and
perhaps unconsciously to view these two types of cases as different."1
While it has never suggested any distinction between the two, it has re-
solved them using fundamentally different approaches.
In determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies, the Court
applies a functional approach. It treats confrontation as a means to the
end of preventing convictions based on unreliable evidence and thus as a
procedure that may be foregone in cases in which the challenged evi-
dence appears sufficiently reliable.
By contrast, in determining how the clause applies when a witness
has appeared in court, the Supreme Court applies a formalistic ap-
proach. 12 It treats confrontation rights as ends in themselves, existing
simply because our Constitution and legal tradition say so, and to be
interpreted without reference to any policy. In effect, the letter of the
Constitution controls, although we must edit the text to clarify its
meaning.
9. The dying declaration rule was well established by the time of the American Revolu-
tion. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 281.
10. In a subcategory of these cases, the question presented is whether the trial court im-
permissibly limited cross-examination by defense counsel. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308 (1974).
11. See infra notes 13-35 and accompanying text.
12. The Court, however, follows a functional approach in determining whether the trial
court impermissibly limited defense cross-examination. See, eg., Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
129, 131 (1968) (limitations are impermissible where they "effectively... emasculate the right
of cross-examination.").
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II. The Recent Supreme Court Cases
In three cases decided since 1986 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Confrontation Clause barred convictions based on hearsay
statements by out-of-court declarants. In three other cases decided since
1986 the Court considered whether the clause was satisfied by a witness's
limited appearance.
A. Cases Concerning the Use of Hearsay Statements by an Out-of-
Court Declarant
1. Inadi
In United States v. Inadi 13 the defendant was tried for conspiracy to
distribute narcotics. The prosecution used as evidence a legally author-
ized wiretap, which contained statements by a coconspirator, Lazaro,
that apparently had been made in furtherance of the conspiracy and
while it was in progress. The defendant argued to the trial court that the
wiretap was inadmissible as hearsay unless Lazaro was called as a wit-
ness or shown to be unavailable.
The trial court initially agreed and admitted the wiretap subject to
the prosecution's later production of Lazaro in court or showing his un-
availability. Lazaro was subpoenaed by the government but failed to ap-
pear, claiming car trouble. Neither the prosecution nor the defense made
any further effort to secure his presence in court. The trial court then
ruled that the wiretap evidence was admissible anyway, under the cocon-
spirator exception to the hearsay rules.14
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the conviction
on the ground that, while the statutory hearsay exception for coconspira-
tors' statements had been satisfied, the Confrontation Clause had not.15
The Supreme Court reversed, restoring the conviction.' 6
The Supreme Court agreed that, in some situations, hearsay cannot
be used against a criminal defendant without showing that the declarant
is unavailable. 7 It said that an in-court appearance, subject to cross-
examination, generally produces better evidence than the hearsay." The
Court nonetheless held that the rule preferring in-court testimony should
13. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
14. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
15. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818-20 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 387
(1986).
16. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986).
17. Id. at 392.
18. Id. at 394.
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not apply to coconspirator statements. 19 Such statements, the Court ar-
gued, are better evidence than in-court testimony since conspirators are
likely to be more candid "when talking to each other in furtherance of
their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand."20
As the dissent noted, the Court's preference for out-of-court state-
ments over in-court testimony was inconsistent with the clause's histori-
cal background-in particular, the common law's pervasive preference
for live testimony.2" Yet the majority had a point. Statements made in
private by coconspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy, unlike affidavits
extracted by the King's torturers in the Raleigh trial, may be more relia-
ble than in-court testimony.22
2. Lee
In Lee v. Illinois23 a man and a woman were charged with murder-
ing the woman's aunt. Both had confessed to the crime, and the man's
confession came after the police told him that the woman had confessed.
The two confessions were similar in many respects, but had at least two
significant inconsistencies: the man's confession suggested greater pre-
meditation by the couple, and each confession portrayed the confessor's
accomplice as somewhat more responsible for the murder.
The woman was convicted after a trial at which both confessions
were used as evidence against her.24 She challenged the use of the man's
confession under the Confrontation Clause, but the state appeals court
affirmed 25 and Illinois argued before the Supreme Court that the two
confessions were sufficiently "interlocking" to be reliable.26
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the
man's confession was not sufficiently reliable.27 The Court noted both
19. Id. at 395.
20. Id. The Court further noted that the defense could have called Lazaro. In addition,
the Court argued that a blanket "production-or-unavailability" rule would burden prosecutors
more than it would benefit defendants. Id. at 399-400.
21. Id. at 403 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. But see id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disputing the greater reliability of cocon-
spirators's statements). Moreover, the prosecution's failure to call an available hearsay declar-
ant may itself make the hearsay unreliable by suggesting a tactically based reluctance to have
the witness appear in court.
23. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
24. The man and woman were tried jointly, and while his confession ostensibly was ad-
mitted only against him, both the prosecutor and the judge referred to it when summing up the
case against her. Id. at 537-38.
25. People v. Lee, 129 Il. App. 3d 1167, 491 N.E.2d 1391 (1984), rev'd, Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530 (1986).
26. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986).
27. Id. at 546-47.
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the inconsistencies between the two confessions and the danger that the
man, after learning of the woman's confession, might shift blame to her
for reasons of self-interest or revenge.28
3. Bourjaily
In Bouraily v. United States29 a government informant had ar-
ranged a drug deal with a middleman named Lonardo. During a taped
telephone conversation, Lonardo told the informant that his "friend"
would buy the drugs in a designated hotel parking lot. The defendant
was arrested in the parking lot immediately after receiving the drugs but
before paying for them. The police found $20,000 in cash in his car.
At trial the prosecution used the taped conversations between
Lonardo and the informant as evidence against the defendant. The de-
fendant appealed under both the Federal Rules of Evidence30 and the
Confrontation Clause, but the Sixth Circuit,31 and then the Supreme
Court, affirmed.32
The Supreme Court held that, so long as a coconspirator's statement
is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts need not inde-
pendently enquire into its reliability.3 3 The Court's rational was that the
coconspirator exception's firm common-law roots (ostensibly grounded
on reliability34) made separate consideration of reliability by the trial
court unnecessary. 5
B. Cases Determining Whether a Witness's Appearance in Court
Satisfied the Confrontation Clause
The prior subpart showed that the Supreme Court views reliability
as critical in assessing whether the Confrontation Clause bars the use of
28. Id. at 544-46. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, applied the same legal standard but dis-
agreed about the facts, arguing that the man's confession was reliable. Id. at 551 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
29. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
30. The principal question was whether Lonardo's statement, admitted under the cocon-
spirator exception to the hearsay rules, could be considered by the judge in determining its
own admissibility (i.e., in determining 'whether a conspiracy existed). See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E). While the defendant argued that this use was improper "bootstrapping," the
Supreme Court held that under the Federal Rules it was permissible. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at
181.
31. United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
32. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 184 (1987).
33. Id. at 183-84.
34. In fact, the coconspirator exception historically reflects an agency theory of conspir-
acy, more than a judgment about reliability. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory com-
mittee's notes.
35. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
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hearsay evidence against criminal defendants. This subpart will show
that the Court views reliability as irrelevant when it assesses the ade-
quacy of an in-court confrontation, when the issue is not whether the
trial court impermissibly limited cross-examination. The subpart begins
by discussing some early cases in which this view emerged.
L Antecedent Cases
In California v. Green 36 the Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a criminal conviction based on testimony given at a pretrial
hearing. The witness who provided that testimony appeared at trial, but
claimed a lack of memory about the underlying events. The Court held
that cross-examination about one's prior testimony at the time of trial
generally satisfies the Confrontation Clause;37 but the Court declined to
consider whether the witness's claimed memory loss made the opportu-
nity for cross-examination at trial constitutionally inadequate, holding
that the issue would not be ripe until considered by the California
Supreme Court on remand.38 Only Justice Harlan, in a concurring opin-
ion, took the position that the effect of the witness's claimed memory loss
on the adequacy of the defendant's opportunity for cross-examination
was constitutionally irrelevant.39
Ten years later, in Ohio v. Roberts," the Court moved closer to Jus-
tice Harlan's position, upholding a conviction based on testimony at a
pretrial hearing although the witness had not appeared at trial. The
Court viewed cross-examination at the preliminary hearing as sufficient
to justify admissibility.
41
Moreover, the Court suggested that the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine at the preliminary hearing, even without actual cross-examination,
might satisfy the Confrontation Clause.42 The Court disregarded that
the motive to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing may be far weaker
than at trial. The applicable standard at a preliminary hearing is prob-
able cause rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; defense counsel
may be less prepared at the preliminary hearing stage; and it may be
tactically unwise to "rehearse" a hostile witness by familiarizing him
36. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
37. Id. at 158-61.
38. Id. at 168-70.
39. Id. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The fact that the witness, though physically
available, cannot recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial
statement or previous testimony ... does not have Sixth Amendment consequence.").
40. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
41. Id. at 73.
42. Id. at 70.
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with lines of attack that one may want to use at trial.43
The Court did not ultimately rely upon its suggestion that the op-
portunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing might be sufficient.
It found that the cross-examination actually conducted by defendant's
counsel at the pretrial hearing was an adequate confrontation, even as-
suming that the opportunity was not enough.44
2. Owens
In United States v. OwelIs 45 a correctional counselor at a federal
prison was savagely assaulted, causing permanent brain damage and se-
vere, progressive memory impairment. Shortly after the assault, while
speaking with hospital attendants, the victim apparently identified some-
one other than the eventual defendant as his assailant.46
A week later the victim no longer remembered who had attacked
him. A month later, in the presence of an FBI agent who visited him in
the hospital, he identified the defendant as his assailant.
By the time of trial the victim had again forgotten who had as-
saulted him, but he ostensibly remembered making the identification dur-
ing the FBI agent's visit. He also remembered feeling certain that he was
correct when he made it. He had no memory of any hospital visitors
during his stay other than the agent on this occasion, although he had
received numerous visitors, both official and personal, including his wife
on a daily basis. He also did not remember whether anyone had sug-
gested to him that the defendant was responsible. In fact, his condition
probably made him highly susceptible to suggestion.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause
grounds, holding that the victim was not adequately subject to cross-
examination given his nearly complete memory loss about both the at-
tack and the circumstances surrounding the identification.47 The
Supreme Court reversed, however, restoring the conviction.48
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court endorsed Justice Harlan's
concurring view in Green that the mere opportunity to cross-examine is
43. See, e.g., United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (Ist Cir. 1979), cerL denied,
446 U.S. 967 (1980).
44. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70.
45. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
46. The hospital records indicated that someone other than the defendant had attacked
the victim. Defense counsel used the records at trial in an unsuccessful effort to refresh the
victim's memory. The records presumably were substantively inadmissible as hearsay because
the attacker's identity was not pertinent to medical treatment. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4)
(hearsay exception for medical records).
47. United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
48. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988).
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constitutionally sufficient even if the witness's good faith memory loss
prevents "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish."4 9 Justice Brennan, dissenting,
criticized the Court's opinion for reducing the right of confrontation to a
"purely procedural protection" that lacked value when the witness
remembered virtually no relevant facts that could be explored on cross-
examination.50
3. Stincer and Coy
In Kentucky v. Stincer5' and Coy v. Iowa52 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of rules shielding child witnesses in sex
abuse cases. Stincer upheld a conviction in which the judge determined
the child witnesses' competency at an in-chambers hearing from which
the defendant, but not his lawyer, was excluded. 53 The Court noted that
the defendant was present during the witnesses' testimony at trial.54
In Coy, however, the Court reversed a conviction because at trial a
screen was placed between the defendant and the child witnesses, permit-
ting the defendant to see the witnesses dimly, but blocking their view of
him.5 In an opinion by Justice Scalia the Court concluded that, under
the Confrontation Clause, in the absence of any waiver by the defendant,
prosecution witnesses must have the defendant in their sight when they
testify.
56
49. Owens, 484 U.S. at 559. The Court relied in large part on Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15 (1985), a per curiam opinion rejecting a Confrontation Clause challenge to a convic-
tion when an expert witness for the prosecution had forgotten which of three possible scientific
theories he had used in formulating his opinion. Fensterer expressly declined to resolve the
question open from Green whether memory loss could affect the constitutional adequacy of
cross-examination. Id. at 20.
50. Owens, 484 U.S. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination and that when
a witness claims forgetfulness about an out-of-court statement the critical question is whether
the cross-examination affords the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for assessing the statement.
Id. at 568. The dissent agreed that in Fensterer a satisfactory basis existed because the expert
witness's memory loss at trial was self-impeaching. In Owens, however, the memory loss at
trial was not self-impeaching since the victim's condition caused progressive memory loss and
the trial took place eighteen months after the out-of-court identification. See id. at 566-67.
51. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
52. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
53. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 732-33.
54. Id. at 740.
55. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The child witnesses testified only about what had happened
and did not identify the defendant. Id. at 2806 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. The Court declined to decide whether the right to a face-to-face view might give way
under some circumstances to a compelling state interest. Id. at 2803. It found that no such
interest existed in this case because the Iowa statute presumed trauma to child witnesses in sex
abuse cases without requiring case-specific findings about trauma by trial judges. Id. Justices
Winter 19901
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Rejecting the traditional view that the clause principally affords a
right to cross-examination, the Court deduced the right to make prosecu-
tion witnesses have the defendant in their sight from Western cultural
tradition, as evidenced principally by the following sources: the Latin
derivation of "confront,"5 7 the words of the Roman Governor Festus,58 a
speech by Shakespeare's Richard II," and the childhood memories of
Dwight Eisenhower.60 The opinion states that the right to visual con-
frontation may have a higher constitutional status than the right to cross-
examination because it is "narrowly and explicitly set forth in the clause
... [not just] reasonably implicit."61
The Court argued that the right to face-to-face visual confrontation
survived for many centuries because in some circumstances it improves
reliability by shaming the false accuser.62 Essentially, however, the
Court's opinion rested on perceived tradition, not policy. The Court
conceded that the sight of the defendant might upset a truthful accuser,
particularly a victim of child abuse, but viewed this as irrelevant since
"[ilt is a truism that constitutional protections have costs."63 Thus, the
Court dismissed any argument that an exception for child witnesses in
sex abuse cases might improve reliability.' 4
III. Attempting to Explain the Supreme Court's Position
As the previous Part showed, under the Supreme Court's decisions
reliability only matters when the question is whether out-of-court hear-
say should be admitted, but not when the question is whether an in-court
appearance by a witness satisfies confrontation rights. This Part briefly
assesses the Court's approach and then tries to explain what has led to it.
O'Connor and White, concurring, offered the view that some procedural devices to shield child
witnesses are constitutionally permissible. Id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J,, concurring).
57. Justice Scalia noted that "[s]imply as a matter of Latin ... the word 'confront' ulti-
mately derives from the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or 'opposed') and the
noun 'frons' (forehead)." Id. at 2800. He also cited Justice Harlan for the proposition that a
right to face-to-face contact follows from the word "confront" "[slimply as a matter of Eng-
lish." Id. Yet "confrontation," at least in modern usage, denotes a hostile encounter and thus
suggests that adversarial interaction is at the heart of the clause.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2801.




A. Assessment of the Court's Bifurcated Approach
On its face, the Court's unacknowledged bifurcated approach to the
Confrontation Clause is perverse. It becomes more so when one closely
examines the results. In particular, the Court's formalistic decisions cre-
ate a bizarre pattern, whether they are compared to each other or to the
functional decisions.
The Confrontation Clause, however it should ultimately be inter-
preted, plainly reflects concern about injustice in the form of erroneous
guilty verdicts and Raleigh-style prosecutorial misconduct. The Court's
formalistic decisions correlate with this concern either negatively or not
at all.
To begin, consider Owens, which gives every appearance of being a
railroaded conviction, conceivably obtained by making suggestions to a
medically impaired witness with a faulty memory. The case is hardly
better than the trial of Raleigh; it is almost as if Lord Cobham had been
brought into court, but under circumstances in which he remembered
nothing but the act of signing his affidavit.
Given the condition of the witness in Owens, the right to cross-ex-
amination did little to address the inherent Raleigh-style dangers. Even
demonstrating the witness's limitations did little to impeach him since
his injuries caused progressive memory loss and the trial took place
eighteen months after the out-of-court identification.65
By comparison, the practice in Coy was innocuous. Whether or not
the use of screens to protect child witnesses in sex abuse cases is wise,66 it
hardly poses a comparable danger of prosecutorial misconduct. The use
of screens not only protects children from trauma and increases the like-
lihood that they will testify, it also may improve reliability by reducing
the danger of psychological intimidation.67
In summary, Owens turns confrontation rights against the defend-
ant, treating them as a substitute for the usual reliability requirement for
the hearsay use of an out-of-court identification because under different
65. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 566-67 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. The use of a screen may have an undesirable tendency to brand the defendant as guilty
in the eyes of the jury. Moreover, in most situations, and perhaps with all adult witnesses,
requiring the witness to have the defendant in sight may improve reliability.
67. Coy is somewhat more defensible on reliability grounds if, as Justice O'Connor's con-
currence suggests, screens may be used when the judge makes case-specific findings of neces-
sity. If case-specific findings of necessity are constitutional, however, it is unclear why rules
conclusively finding it in narrowly defined circumstances (i.e., for all child witnesses in sex
abuse cases) are not. Almost the entire history of the hearsay exceptions is one of developing
general categories so that case-specific assessments of reliability are unnecessary. In Bouraily
the Supreme Court held that such categories can serve as substitutes for case-specific findings.
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-84 (1987).
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circumstances the rights might have ensured reliability. Coy trium-
phantly vindicates confrontation rights, but under circumstances in
which they seem unrelated to preventing injustice.
Coy becomes even more bizarre alongside Inadi. Considered to-
gether, the two cases suggest that if a child sex abuse witness would be
intimidated by testifying in sight of the defendant, the prosecution can
keep him or her out altogether while using the witness's testimony in
hearsay form;68 but it cannot bring the witness into court and protect
him or her by using a screen. 69 Thus, the prosecution can spare the ac-
cusing witness from having the defendant in sight, but only if it avoids
cross-examination by the defendant and denies the jury a view of the
witness as well.10
One possible way to rationalize the Court's decisions is to view its
approach as analogous to that which applies to writings through the best
evidence rule (that is, the rule that, when a party seeks to prove the con-
tents of a writing, the original generally must be produced if possible).7 1
Under this explanation in-court testimony must be used whenever possi-
ble (unless, as in Inadi, the out-of-court evidence is more reliable), but
once the prosecution has done all it can to provide a full confrontation
(as it arguably did in Owens but failed to do in Coy), nothing further is
required.
The problems with this explanation are twofold. First, since the
meaning of "confrontation" is not facially obvious, it is only reasonable
to consider its purposes in determining its scope (as the Court failed to
do in Coy).72 Both policy and the history of the hearsay rules suggest
that these purposes have something to do with reliability and with the
capacity of cross-examination to subject evidence to meaningful
68. The hearsay must be considered more reliable than in-court testimony for Inadi to
support its use.
69. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit so held in Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1227-30 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 835 (1990). In Nelson the defendant was convicted of
sexually assaulting a three-year old child, based in part on hearsay statements that the child
had made out of court to a psychologist. The child's unavailability for constitutional purposes
was unclear; she could have been called as a witness, but was considered unlikely to respond to
questioning in court about the incident. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction on the
ground that under Inadi the out-of-court statements by the child to the psychologist were
more reliable and better evidence than an in-court appearance. Id. at 1228-30.
70. Of course, the defendant can call any available witness whose testimony the prosecu-
tion chooses to introduce only in hearsay form. This often is tactically undesirable, however,
in comparison to cross-examination during the prosecution's case.
71. See FED. R. EvID. 1001-1008.
72. The best evidence rule for writings is not similarly unclear on its face.
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challenge.7"
Second, in light of Owens, the Court's decisions do not fulfill the
analogy to the treatment of writings under the law of evidence. In effect,
they apply the best evidence rule without the accompanying requirement
that a writing that is admitted in evidence be authenticated (for instance,
through handwriting evidence or reasonable self-authentication).74 Ar-
guably, live testimony is not analogously authenticated unless cross-ex-
amination can provide the jury with some basis for evaluating the
testimony-as was impossible in Owens due to the witness's progressive
memory loss during the nineteen month period between the identification
and the trial.75
B. Broader Reasons for the Court's Bifurcated Approach
Despite its peculiarities, the Supreme Court's formalistic approach
to the adequacy of confrontation rights might be understandable if it
were necessary as a matter of textual interpretation. It is not. As to
Owens, no established canon of constitutional interpretation holds that
when a right is technically vindicated, but under circumstances that may
eliminate its value, all constitutional inquiry must come to an end. As to
Coy, the Constitution does not say that confrontation means having the
defendant in the witness's sight. Dean Wigmore, the pre-eminent scholar
in the history of the law of evidence, long ago argued that the term refers
essentially to cross-examination.76 Moreover, the Court allows the use of
reliable out-of-court hearsay, despite the lack of face-to-face confronta-
tion, expressly on the ground that policy, not the literal text of the Con-
stitution, controls.
Accordingly, the question arises why the Supreme Court has
thought it necessary to adopt an approach that is so logically inconsistent
and perverse as policy. In considering this question it is important to
avoid the fallacy of over-interpretation. One should not expect too much
consistency from an overworked Court that responds ad hoc to cases as
73. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 244 (noting the actual and perceived unreli-
ability of hearsay); J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1367 (describing cross-examination as "the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.").
74. See FED. R. EVID. 901-903.
75. It makes sense to accompany a best evidence rule with an authentication rule for live
testimony as well as writings. Both types of evidence may otherwise be unduly credited by
juries. Moreover, in both cases one could argue that concern about reliability should not come
to an end simply because the litigant has advanced a type of evidence that usually is good. A
best evidence rule's purpose of preventing the tactical choice to use worse evidence arguably is
just an application of reliability-the fact that a self-interested litigant preferred the worse
evidence suggests that it is unreliable.
76. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 6.
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they arise and decides them based on shifting internal coalitions. More-
over, since the bifurcated approach has never been made explicit by the
Court, it may be discarded at any time, consciously or unconsciously.
The approach seems more a reflex than a considered strategy.
Yet even reflexes have their reasons. Issues concerning the admissi-
bility of hearsay may evoke a different response than issues concerning
the adequacy of a confrontation for reasons relating to the Court's per-
ceptions and intellectual baggage.
When the question is whether hearsay can be used against a defend-
ant, the Court recognizes that it is departing from the literal text of the
Constitution. It also has the long history of hearsay exceptions to guide
it in determining when hearsay can be used. These exceptions are too
cumbersome and rigid to be specifically constitutionalized (although
Bouraily moves in that direction), but they focus the Court's attention
on the exceptions' principal guiding policy: reliability.
When the question is whether adequate confrontation rights have
been afforded, the Court is similarly unguided by the text of the Consti-
tution, but cannot similarly draw guidance from the common law. It
therefore must fall back on broader principles, and in several key cases
these principles have been supplied by Justice Scalia, an important swing
vote77 and the author of Owens and Coy.78
Justice Scalia is self-consciously a jurisprudential conservative. He
frequently argues that a judge's job is to interpret the law, not to act as a
legislator imposing his own preferences. Moreover, he views constitu-
tional interpretation as requiring a strict reading of the text, supple-
mented only by reference to clear community traditions.79
Owens and Coy show Scalia at work in the area of adequacy of con-
frontation rights when neither the constitutional text nor common-law
traditions provide helpful guidance. His response, essentially, has been
77. In the four confrontation cases decided since his arrival Scalia has been willing to
support either prosecution or defense (although the latter only in Coy) and has been part of the
majority each time.
78. Roberts, which began the movement towards formalism, was decided before Justice
Scalia's arrival on the Court. Its suggestion that the mere opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses at preliminary hearings is sufficient may reflect the idiosyncratic nature of the issue
presented. Extensive cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, as was conducted in Rob-
erts, arguably establishes reliability. Yet once one decides to admit preliminary hearing testi-
mony that has been extensively crossed, excluding it in other cases has the perverse effect of
penalizing defendants who elect to cross-examine adverse witnesses at that stage. This may
appear unduly to reward a tactical calculation that the witness may disappear before trial.
Moreover, it may weaken the capacity of preliminary hearings to -weed out unmeritorious
cases.
79. See, e.g., Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-02 (1988) (relying on clear community tradition).
to pretend that he has a text. He strictly and narrowly interprets a re-
vised Confrontation Clause that states, "The accused shall enjoy the
right to meet face-to-face the witnesses against him, except when these
witnesses have provided reliable hearsay." In interpreting this imagined
language, concerns of policy, when not explicit (that is, "reliable hear-
say") are anathema-although a general concern about reliability and
preventing prosecutorial misconduct should be relatively uncontroversial
as policy.
Even when applied coherently, Scalia's jurisprudential conservativ-
ism tars all policy concerns with the same brush. It makes no distinction
for policies that are relatively uncontroversial. Moreover, his approach
ensures that the law of evidence will fail to advance any consistent set of
purposes.
Constitutional rights such as confrontation arose for reasons: they
are today's traditions because they were yesterday's policies. Justice
Scalia's jurisprudential conservatism rigidifies and totemizes these poli-
cies. When the justifications for rights are forgotten or ignored, the
rights become impediments to a rational legal procedure, not means of
ensuring rationality.
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